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Wrongful Convictions and Due Process 
Violations
Cheryl (Shelly) Taylor George, Duncan School of Law,  
    Lincoln Memorial University
Abstract 
This analytical essay looks at the myriad of ways innocent people are wrongfully convicted and how the 
criminal justice system fails to truly reach a fair and equitable result. The article looks at how at the initial 
stages of a criminal proceeding, a defendant can be prejudiced to the point of sufficient harm to his chances 
at being given a fair and impartial judicial proceeding. This article examines how fatal mistakes can be 
made and reveals that there can be flaws in the science of DNA testing, including fraud, criminologist bias, 
improper laboratory procedures, and human error. This article seeks to point out major factors that can 
contribute to an innocent individual being erroneously convicted of a crime and how that happens more 
times than one may think. 
There is no more serious error or representa-
tion of the flaws of the American criminal jus-
tice system than when an innocent man, after 
spending years on death row, away from his 
family, friends, and the life that he knows, 
makes that long walk to the death chambers, 
says his final goodbyes, is strapped to a bed, 
and is lethally injected until his heart stops 
beating. Not only has the system, which is 
designed to keep criminals away from soci-
ety, failed by taking an innocent man’s life, 
but it has allowed a guilty man to stay on 
the streets, dwelling among unsuspecting 
citizens.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution clearly establish that 
everyone is entitled to the due process of the 
law; this concept precedes the creation of  
our institutions (Powell v. Alabama, 1932). Due 
process “embodies one of the broadest and 
most far reaching guarantees of personal and 
property rights. It is necessary for the enjoy-
ment of life, liberty and property” (Powell v. 
Alabama, 1932). While the courts have not set 
out a standard definition of due process in a 
criminal proceeding, it generally consists of 
the right to a fair trial, conducted in a com-
petent manner; right to be present at trial; 
right to an impartial jury; and the right to be 
heard in one’s own defense. In Powell, the U.S. 
Supreme Court illustrated that a defendant in 
a criminal case is afforded due process when 
there is a defined law, a competent court, 
accusation in due form, notice of the charges 
against the defendant and the right to answer 
those charges, a trial conducted according to 
established procedure, and the assurance that 
the defendant will be discharged if found not 
guilty. Opponents of the death penalty argue 
that the process in which a defendant is tried 
violates this fundamental right that the fram-
ers of the Constitution gave the citizens of 
our country. In light of recent exonerations of 
many men and women wrongfully convicted, 
that argument carries weight.
Many jurisdictions are working toward 
reducing wrongful convictions—especially 
in capital murder cases. However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Kansas v. Marsh 
(2006), which upheld Kansas’s death penalty 
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law, may prove to be more of a hurdle and a 
hindrance than an improvement in decreasing 
wrongful convictions: “Kansas law provides 
that if a unanimous jury finds that aggravat-
ing circumstances are not outweighed by mit-
igating circumstances, the death penalty shall 
be imposed” (“Sentencing,” Kansas Statutes 
Annotated, 1995; repealed 2010). The Kansas 
Supreme Court found that the law violated the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
U.S. Constitution because in the event of equi-
poise, the mitigating factors weigh equally 
with the aggravating circumstances; in this 
event, the death penalty must be imposed. 
Marsh argued that the statute was unconsti-
tutional because it established a presumption 
of death. However, the U.S. Supreme Court 
overruled the Kansas decision and upheld 
the constitutionality of the statute. The Court 
reasoned that the statute actually works in 
the defendant’s favor because it requires “the 
State to bear the burden of proving to the jury, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that aggravators 
are not outweighed by mitigators and that a 
sentence of death is therefore appropriate; it 
places no additional evidentiary burden on 
the capital defendant” (Kansas v. Marsh, 2006).
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, noted 
that “reversal of an erroneous conviction
on appeal or on habeas, or the pardoning of 
an innocent condemnee through executive
clemency, demonstrates not the failure of
the system but its success” (Kansas v. Marsh, 
2006). Even so, how can a system be just if the 
innocent man has to fight for his life? If one 
is innocent until proven guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, how are innocent people being 
convicted?
Scalia praised the criminal justice system
for functioning correctly when an innocent 
person is pardoned through appeal or clem-
ency. While it is favorable that an innocent 
man is released, the detriment a wrongful 
conviction can have on a man’s life and lib-
erty, in addition to the stigma that is attached 
to convicted criminals, is irreversible. Anyone 





when an innocent man is exonerated from 
a crime that he did not commit. However, 
allowing an innocent man to remain incarcer-
ated for years does not prove that the criminal 
justice system functions correctly. Our system 
provides that any man that is accused of a 
crime is innocent until he is found guilty by a 
jury of his peers beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It follows logically, therefore, that when an 
innocent man is convicted, there must be 
error somewhere in the judicial process when 
an innocent man is convicted.  
Unfortunately, it is a sad fact that due pro-
cess violations are infiltrating the system at 
every stage of the judicial process. To high-
light some of these violations, this article will 
examine real-life cases in which an innocent 
man was convicted and, subsequently, his 
conviction was questioned.
The Arrest and Investigation: Police 
and Prosecutorial Misconduct in 
the Early Stages of a Case
A fundamental principle in criminal pro-
cedure is that you cannot make an arrest 
without probable cause (Book v. Ohio, 1964). 
Considering the number of convictions that 
are being overturned due to actual innocence, 
a fair question to ask is “How was an innocent 
man arrested in the first place?” The case of 
Ruben Cantu highlights how police miscon-
duct may have led to a wrongful arrest, and 
even worse, to an innocent man’s execution.
Ruben Montoya Cantu: Executed  
August 24, 1993
There is more than one reason why Ruben 
Cantu should be alive today. When two 
young men broke into a house and shot at 
Pedro Gomez and Juan Moreno, killing Pedro 
and severely injuring Juan, Ruben was just 
17 years old. He was also 17 at the time he 
was arrested for capital murder, and he was 
26 when he was executed for a crime that the 
surviving victim, the co-defendant, and other 
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people from his community say that he never 
committed. Cantu claimed his innocence up 
until his final moments of his life, just after 
midnight August 24, 1993.
There was talk at Cantu’s high school that he 
was the shooter. Based on this hearsay, offi-
cers took photos of Juan Moreno, the surviv-
ing victim. As he lay in bed recovering from 
being shot over 15 times, Officer Bill Ewell 
showed Moreno pictures of Cantu and other 
Mexican men, but Moreno insisted that none 
of the photos matched the robber. The officers 
tried several other times to show photos of 
Cantu, but every time Moreno insisted it was 
not Cantu who did the shooting. 
The case appeared to be closed until four 
months later. Cantu was at a bar and was 
involved in a physical altercation with an off-
duty officer. After the officer flashed his gun, 
Cantu fired his gun at the officer. The officer 
was injured, but all charges against Cantu 
were dismissed because he was acting in 
self-defense. This act infuriated other police 
officers as well as Officer Ewell. This incident 
prompted Ewell to reopen the Gomez murder 
case. Ewell went back to Juan Moreno with 
photographs of Cantu, but this time Moreno 
was told that law enforcement had solid evi-
dence that Cantu was the murderer and that 
they needed him to testify in court. Moreno 
eventually did testify, and Cantu was con-
victed on the basis of the in-court identifica-
tion by Moreno. Moreno was the only testify-
ing witness against Cantu.
It also must be noted that, at the time, Moreno 
was a 15-year-old undocumented person 
living illegally in the United States, and he 
spoke no English. He must have been terri-
fied at the police coming to his home multi-
ple times attempting to get him to identify a 
person as a shooter when he initially stood by 
his statement that the shooter was not Ruben 
Cantu. The record also reflected that Cantu 
had what appeared to be a solid alibi: he was 
in a different city on the day of the shooting. 
He also had no prior convictions and had not 
had any problems with the law.
Ruben Cantu’s case is not the only example 
of how the police can manipulate an investi-
gation: “Innocent defendants are sometimes 
pressured into confessing to crimes they did 
not commit, especially when the prospect of a 
plea bargain is presented to them” (Blackerby, 
2003, p. 1190).
The Hearing: The Right to an 
Impartial Proceeding
It is a right that anyone accused of a crime be 
heard by an impartial, competent judiciary, 
and it is essential that the appearance of jus-
tice be present throughout the entire judicial 
process (Bradshaw v. McCotter, 1986, p. 1329). 
But recent studies are proving that this right 
is more of a fiction than fact. While the cir-
cumstances of each capital case are different, 
so are the methods being used to convict. 
Thus, there is no single factor that can be spe-
cifically identified that has led to erroneous 
convictions. Blackerby (2003) lists some of the 
factors that can be specified as variables in 
these wrongful convictions: (1) faulty foren-
sics (also known as “junk science”); (2) pros-
ecutorial, judicial, and police misconduct;  
(3) racial prejudice; and (4) ineffective assis-
tance of counsel (predominantly harmful to 
impoverished defendants who take court-ap-
pointed counsel) (p. 1186). Blackerby also cites 
a study examining the most common errors 
in capital cases between 1973 and 1995 and 
found that the rate of prejudicial error was 68% 
(p. 1186). However, the Supreme Court held 
in Bordenkircher v. Hays (1978) that a coerced 
plea bargain does not violate due process  
(p. 365). 
Evidence Gathering
A 1996 Department of Justice study reported 
that 28 persons had been released from prison 
as a result of post-trial DNA testing (p. 2). The 
state’s expert witness in four of these cases 
Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2015 • 15(4)70
was Fred Zain. Even though Zain had been 
discredited by the West Virginia Supreme 
Court and was tried on charges of theft of 
services based upon his routine perjurious 
testimony, Texas has continued to fight and 
save convictions supported by Zain’s testi-
mony that has been shown to be unreliable 
and fallacious. 
Another known case of an expert witness lying 
on the stand is forensic scientist Joyce Gilchrist 
in Oklahoma. During her 21-year career at 
the Oklahoma City Police Department, she 
helped the prosecution send 23 defendants to 
death row (Kofman, 2001). All of these cases 
were re-examined once it was revealed that 
her testimony was flawed or false. Tragically, 
11 of the men had already been executed.
Recently, generally accepted methods of
forensic testing have come under close exam-
ination. Unfortunately, when these types of 
methods have become so prevalent in the 
courtroom, how does one effectively exclude 
them at this point? Moreover, what happens 
when unsubstantiated scientific theory is 
allowed into evidence at trial?
In 2004, Lavelle Davis was sentenced to  
45 years after Stephen McKasson explained to 
jurors that lip prints left at the crime scene on 
a piece of duct tape linked him to the crime. 
As one juror put it, “the lip print . . . ’proved 
that he had actually committed the crime’” 
(McRoberts, Mills, & Possley, 2004). The only 
problem: the assertion about the lip print was 
not true. These are just some examples of 
how easily forensic science’s false impression 
of infallibility has the power to distort the 
system of true justice.
The legal system, in its pursuit of justice, 
cannot count on local forensic labs to provide 
competent forensic testing or accept DNA, 
ballistics, fingerprint, odontology, bullet 
lead analysis, or any other “science” with-
out closely examining the scientific methods 
involved in obtaining the evidence.
We live in an age where the media undeniably 
can have a profound influence on the general 
public and jurors. Television shows such as 
CSI and Law & Order, which are filled with 
every new and old method of forensic testing, 
have the general public convinced that these 
methods are infallible.
DNA Testing
DNA testing can be an essential link between 
a crime and convicting the right person; how-
ever, a defendant’s ability to access DNA test-
ing is a procedural challenge to proving his 
innocence. While proponents of DNA testing 
have done an excellent job making it appear 
to be reliable, the evidence has been under 
close scrutiny in the legal and scientific com-
munities (Faigman, Kaye, Saks, & Sanders, 
2002, pp. 208-209).
In cases in which innocent men were exon-
erated by post-conviction DNA tests, mis-
leading forensic science came in second place 
behind mistaken eyewitness testimony as a 
cause of false conviction (Nethercott, 2003; 
Scheck, Neufield, & Dwyer, 2000). Even if a 
DNA method of testing is generally accepted, 
there are other factors that must be called into 
question. These depend on the specific cir-
cumstances in each individual case. Flaws in 
the science of DNA testing are not the only 
source of improper conclusions; fraud, crim-
inologist bias, improper lab procedures, and 
human error exacerbate the problem.
Criminologist Bias
While DNA analysis relies heavily on com-
puter equipment, interpreting the results is 
occasionally determined by an examiner’s 
subjective judgment. One must look to psy-
chology to understand how bias plays a role 
in scientific testing: “An elementary princi-
ple of modern psychology is that the desires 
and expectations people possess influence 
their perceptions and interpretations of what 
they observe” (Risinger, Saks, Thompson, & 
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Rosenthal, 2002, p. 6). Since this holds true 
when the observer has a mild expectation, it 
is understandable that when someone has a 
strong desire to see a particular result, there 
is an increased likelihood that it will be seen 
(p. 6).
In criminal cases, this poses a serious problem 
when DNA is interpreted by laboratory work-
ers who have an underlying desire to play an 
integral part in crime solving: “When faced 
with an ambiguous situation, where the call 
could go either way, crime lab analysis fre-
quently slant their interpretations in ways that 
support prosecution theories” (Thompson, 
Ford, Doom, Raymer, & Krane, 2003). A simple 
examination of a crime lab’s notes has re- 
vealed that analysts are often aware of more 
facts than necessary to make a scientific judg-
ment about evidence. Even more dangerous, 
they may be aware of which results will aid 
the prosecution’s case and those that will hurt 
it (Thompson et al., 2003). One analyst’s notes 
stated, “Suspect known Crip gang member 
keeps ‘skating’ on charges—never serves 
time. This robbery he gets hit in head with 
bar stool—left blood trail. [Detective] Miller 
wants to connect this guy to scene w/DNA” 
(Thompson et al., 2003).
Directors of crime labs in Cleveland, Houston 
and Montana have all been accused of giving 
misleading testimony which led to false con-
victions (Nethercott, 2003). An astounding 
number of these cases have come to light and 
cast serious doubt on DNA testing, despite its 
benefits.
Improper Lab Procedures
In 2003, the Houston Police Department was 
forced to close the DNA and serology sec-
tion of its crime labs after television journal-
ists exposed serious flaws in its procedures: 
“Two men who were falsely incriminated 
by botched lab work have been released
after subsequent DNA testing proved their 
innocence” (Thompson & Nethercott, 2004). 
Unfortunately, what happened in Houston 
 
is not an isolated incident. California, 
Illinois, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington State 
also have documented cases of error. 
Generally, these problems are due to cross- 
contamination, mislabeling, and human mis-
takes (Thompson & Nethercott, 2004).
In addition to their bias, criminologists far 
too often form conclusions about evidence 
based on beliefs and assertions they derive 
from training, knowledge, and experience but 
have not been adequately tested to be sup-
ported by concrete scientific data (Thompson 
& Nethercott, 2004). Some criminologist train-
ing has come from the directors of their labs; 
the same directors who have been found 
guilty of misrepresenting testing in favor of 
the prosecution.
Fingerprint Analysis
Fingerprint analysis has been finding its way 
into criminal trials since 1910 when the first 
man was convicted by matching his finger-
prints to prints left at the scene. Examiners 
proffer that the craft is flawless, even denying 
the possibility that a trained examiner who 
follows procedure could reach a wrong con-
clusion (Thompson & Cole, 2005). The prob-
lem is that fingerprint analysis makes sense 
because there is the belief that no two fin-
gerprints are alike; therefore, the fingerprint 
evidence is inherently correct: “The real ques-
tion is not whether all fingerprints are differ-
ent, but, rather, how accurate are fingerprint 
examiners at matching the small, fragmen-
tary prints you find at crime scenes” (Humes, 
2004). There have been false fingerprint iden-
tifications, but professionals in the field attri-
bute it to incompetent examiners, thus, allow-
ing the method to remain perfect (Thompson 
& Cole, 2005). 
The debate behind fingerprinting is led by the 
question “What is the science?” Simon Cole, 
a Social Science professor at the University 
of California, Irvine, answers the question by 
explaining “No one knows because there has 
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never been a scientific study to find out. They 
have never allowed it” (Humes, 2004). Many 
leading fingerprint examiners have agreed 
with Cole’s response. The reality is there is 
no concrete standard used to determine what 
portion of a print must be recovered before it 
is suitable for comparison. Even more trou-
bling is that there is no significant research 
available to say whether or not people share 
fingerprint patterns: “In 1995, one of the only 
independent proficiency tests of fingerprint 
examiners in U.S. crime labs found that nearly 
a quarter reported false positives” (McRoberts 
et al., 2004). 
The Case of Brandon Mayfield
In 2004, federal prosecutors claimed they 
were 100% sure of the positive identifica-
tion of fingerprints lifted from a bag linking 
a Portland, Oregon, attorney to the Madrid 
Tower bombing case (Wax & Schatz, 2004,  
p. 6). A few weeks later, the FBI was embar-
rassed to admit that it was wrong due to an 
erroneous fingerprint comparison (p. 6). If 
investigators from Spain had not linked the 
fingerprints to a known terrorist, Brandon 
Mayfield, the Oregon attorney who had never 
even been to Spain, could still be locked up 
in a federal correctional facility. This incident 
disproved the theory that errors result from 
examiner incompetence because three of the 
most highly experienced examiners working 
for the FBI all came to the same erroneous 
conclusion (Thompson & Cole, 2005). 
Several theories came out of the Mayfield 
case. One in particular raised the issue of bias. 
Mayfield was an immediate suspect because he 
had converted to Islam, had an Egyptian wife, 
had military training, and had represented a 
member of a group of Muslims suspected of 
terrorist conspiracy (Thompson & Cole, 2005). 
In addition to this possible instance of bias, in 
1997, an investigation conducted on the FBI 
proved that “FBI examiners had relied on col-
lateral evidence when making key ‘scientific’ 
determinations” (Thompson & Cole, 2005). 
In light of the turnover of the Mayfield case, 
the FBI reviewed the case and issued a report. 
Part of the report blames “confirmation bias,” 
which is when one perceives what one expects 
or desires (Thompson & Cole, 2005). The 
report also concluded that because the initial 
examiner was highly respected, the two sub-
sequent examiners tended to agree without a 
thoroughly complete and accurate examina-
tion. As with DNA testing, human bias can 
negatively impact the outcome.
Forensic Odontology
Bite-Mark Analysis
Bite-mark analysis is an extension of odontol-
ogy which entered forensics in 1970. Usually, 
dental experts are used to identify the 
remains of unknown corpses using dental 
records. However, evaluating bite marks fre-
quently occurs in violent cases in which the 
alleged perpetrator leaves bite marks on his 
victim. Judges allow forensic dentists to tes-
tify regarding bite marks despite “having no 
accepted way to measure their rate of error or 
the benefit of peer review” (McRoberts et al., 
2004). Bite-mark analysis also lacks reviewed 
research and scientific validation, which are 
essential elements of distinguishing science 
from guesswork (McRoberts & Mills, 2004). 
During the trial of Ted Bundy, forensic dental 
experts testified for the prosecutors that bite 
marks left on one victim’s body was a match 
to Bundy’s teeth. Twenty-five years after the 
trial, the prosecutor’s expert confessed “that 
the Bundy trial left a problematic legacy. It 
catapulted bite-mark evidence to the point 
where [many] were saying, ‘A bite mark is as 
good as a fingerprint’” (McRoberts & Mills, 
2004). Now, he claims that this belief is wrong 
and warns against using it (McRoberts & 
Mills, 2004).
Bite-mark analysis is truly an opinion, with 
no supporting mathematical or scientific 
research supporting a human’s observation. 
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While a bite mark and a wound can be sim-
ilar, one should never assume that they are 
identical.
Ray Krone: Spent Over 10 Years in Prison 
for a Murder He Did Not Commit
Ray Krone was charged with murder, kidnap-
ping, and sexual assault in 1991, but his con-
viction was overturned, and he was released 
10 years later (Hansen, 2005, p. 48). Kim 
Ancona’s naked body was found laid across 
the men’s bathroom of the bar where she 
worked. She had been stabbed 11 times. There 
were few clues to help investigators find the 
attacker. There was no semen, and there were 
no fingerprints; however, the police did find 
bite marks on the victim’s neck and breast.
Krone became a suspect because he was a 
regular customer at the bar and a friend of 
Kim’s. After taking a styrofoam impression of 
Krone’s teeth, he was charged with murder. 
Krone, who was a 35-year-old mailman, had 
no prior convictions. During trial, an expert 
testified that the impression from Krone’s 
teeth was a match to the bite marks left on the 
victim’s body. Despite maintaining his inno-
cence, Krone was convicted and sentenced to 
death. Three years later, his conviction was 
overturned; and he was granted a new trial 
based on a procedural technicality. But, once 
again, Krone was convicted and sentenced 
to life in prison due to the bite-mark expert’s 
testimony.
Luckily, traces of saliva were recovered from 
the victim’s body. In 2002, a DNA exam was 
finally conducted, and Krone’s cry of inno-
cence was finally heard (Hansen, 2005, p. 48).
Gunshot Residue Testing
The moment a gun is fired, particles of gun-
powder leave the gun. The premise that 
gunshot residue (hereinafter GSR) testing 
is based on is that the powder blows onto 
the shooter’s hands and body (Nethercott & 
Thompson, 2005). Although this may be true, 
recent studies have revealed that the powder 
does not stay confined to the shooter’s body. 
Forensic scientists have been testifying that 
evidence of gunpowder is conclusive to estab-
lish that the person was the shooter.
Today, many scientists have done a signi- 
ficant amount of research to disprove this 
claim. Peter DeForest of John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice in New York argues, “I don’t 
think [gunshot residue testing is] a very valu-
able technique to begin with. It’s great chem-
istry. It’s great microscopy. The question is, 
how did the particle get there?” (Mejia, 2005). 
The answer is, as modern research has proven, 
GSR can be transferred through a number of 
means.
At the Institute of Criminalistics in Prague, 
Czech Republic, scientists found that a non-
shooter may come into contact with GSR 
without going near a firearm (Mejia, 2005). 
The scientists fired a gun in a closed room and 
then collected particles two meters from the 
place of the shooting: “They detected unique 
particles up to eight minutes after a shot was 
fired, suggesting that someone [who] entered 
the scene after a shooting could have more 
particles on them than a shooter who runs 
away immediately” (Mejia, 2005).
Several police departments throughout the 
country have conducted their own inter-
nal investigations on GSR; all of them have 
seen similar, disturbing results. In 2000, the 
Los Angeles County Coroner’s Department 
revealed a suspect could become contam-
inated with GSR by riding in the back of a 
police car: “Of 50 samples from the back seats 
of patrol cars, they found 45 contained parti-
cles consistent with GSR and four had ‘highly 
specific’ GSR particles” (Mejia, 2005). 
In 2001, after conducting an internal investi-
gation, the Baltimore City Police Department 
found high levels of GSR contamination in 
areas of the police station where suspects 
were processed for GSR collection. Samples 
collected from the furniture where suspects 
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were held, surfaces that suspects would 
touch, and even the air in the process area 
were positive for GSR particles (Nethercott & 
Thompson, 2005).
In addition to these findings at the police 
station, materials found in the GSR can also 
be found in the environment. Fireworks and 
industrial tools use materials with composi-
tions similar to those found in GSR particles. 
Car mechanics are most likely to be falsely 
identified as having GSR on their bodies 
because some brake linings contain heavy 
metals that may be confused and misidenti-
fied as GSR particles (Mejia, 2005). 
A main concern is not with how reliable GSR 
testing can be, but with the scientific methods 
of testing and procedure: “As currently prac-
ticed . . . there are no definitive standards for 
distinguishing gunshot residue from other 
substances” (Nethercott & Thompson, 2005). 
Up until 2000, most labs found positive GSR 
samples if they detected particles of barium 
and antimony. But, studies revealed that 
these particles are found in substances in 
nature that are completely unrelated to fire-
arms (Nethercott & Thompson, 2005). In 2002, 
scientists “identified a substance as ‘unique 
GSR’ only if they found a combination of 
barium, antimony and lead fused together in 
a single particle” (Nethercott & Thompson, 
2005). But, yet again, that theory was doubted 
after a demonstration that these particles 
could be found in brake linings. 
If examiners who take the samples from the 
suspects would also take control samples 
from the area where the suspect was exposed, 
this could help detect GSR contamination:  “If 
GSR can be detected all over the environment 
that the suspect has been exposed to, then it 
would be foolish to claim that finding GSR 
on the suspect is a sure sign that he fired the 
gun” (Nethercott & Thompson, 2005). Most 
scientists never bother taking a sample from 
any other location than the suspect’s hands. 
Janine Arvizu, an independent lab auditor 
from New Mexico, conducted a reviews of the 
Baltimore City Police Department (BCPD). 
She concluded that “The BCPD lab routinely 
reported gunshot residue collected from a 
subject’s hands most probably arose from 
proximity to a discharging firearm, despite 
the fact that comparable levels of gunshot resi-
due were detected in the laboratory’s contam-
ination studies” (Mejia, 2005). Not only was 
the BCPD using improper procedures, “the 
department’s sole GSR analyst was giving 
deceptive and misleading testimony in crimi-
nal trials” (Nethercott & Thompson, 2005).
A combination of factors, such as insufficient 
scientific proof, inconsistent lab procedures, 
and analysts willing to make unsupported 
conclusions, makes GSR testing an unreliable 
source of forensic science.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
My uneasiness about the verdict in the 
Amrine case has to do with the fact that the 
defense attorney gave us very little to work 
with. . . . I got the impression that when he 
was presenting the defense case, he was 
meeting witnesses for the very first time.  
    —Larry Hildebrand, death penalty juror   
       (the defendant was later exonerated) 
The Sixth Amendment provides that anyone 
accused of a crime shall enjoy the right “to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” 
Although this is a right clearly established 
in the U.S. Constitution, most states have 
adopted the concept into their states’ con-
stitutions, even though the Supreme Court 
has held that, by way of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, due process rights, includ-
ing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
applies to states as well. 
Justice Black in Gideon v. Wainwright stated,
The right of one charged with crime to counsel 
may not be deemed fundamental and essen-
tial to fair trials in some countries, but it is 
in ours. From the very beginning, our state 
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and national constitutions and laws have laid 
great emphasis on procedural and substantive 
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before 
impartial tribunals in which every defendant 
stands equal before the law. This noble ideal 
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with 
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer 
to assist him.
Murder trials can be very expensive and time 
consuming, and they require a great deal 
of experience. Unfortunately, many people 
accused of murder are indigent and cannot 
afford the best legal representation. Gerry 
Spence, one of the most well-known trial 
attorneys in America, wrote in his book, The 
Smoking Gun, about a woman and her son 
accused of murder in Lincoln County, Oregon:
If a trial lawyer won’t take on a murder case 
because he doesn’t want to get his hands dirty 
or because there isn’t any money in it, the 
system fails. It not only fails the accused, it fails 
the rest of us. Some day when some fair-haired 
prosecutor with the governor’s chair glowing 
in his mind’s eye decides to charge one of us or 
one of our kids with a crime—well, that hated, 
scorned, and damned of the legal profession, 
the trial lawyer, better be around to see that we 
get a fair trial, and that if we’re innocent, we 
walk out of the courtroom free. (p. 3)
It appears that many trial lawyers are keeping 
their hands clean, while men and women are 
faced with proceedings that do not meet con-
stitutional guarantees. 
The Scottsboro Boys
In 1932, seven young African-American males 
were sentenced to death for the rape of two 
young, white females. At that time, the sen-
tence of rape in Alabama could range from 
10 years’ confinement to death. The young, 
illiterate boys were arraigned one week after 
the alleged rapes took place, and all pled not 
guilty. The boys were tried in three separate 
trials, and all three were completed in one 
single day. One of the rape victims later, while 
testifying for the defense in open court, stated 
that she had lied about the rapes to get herself 
out of trouble. The Alabama Supreme Court 
upheld the conviction; and only the Chief 
Justice, in a vigorous dissent, found that the 
trials were unfair and that the boys had been 
denied due process of law and equal protec-
tion rights (Powell v. Alabama, 1932, p. 50). 
The Supreme Court took the case on appeal 
and only looked at the second claim raised: 
that the young boys “were denied the right 
to counsel with the accustomed incidents of 
consultation and opportunity of prepara-
tion for trial” (Powell v. Alabama, 1932, p. 50). 
Although the court had appointed counsel for 
the defendants during arraignment, none was 
appointed afterwards. On the day the trial 
was to begin, appearing without attorneys, 
the boys were never asked if they had counsel 
or whether they had been given the oppor-
tunity to contact relatives who could have 
assisted them in obtaining counsel. The trial 
began six days after the indictment: “No one 
answered for the defendants or appeared to 
represent or defend them” (Powell v. Alabama, 
1932, p. 53). 
The morning of the trial, one attorney who 
was just there to observe said that he would 
represent them if no one else would. The trial 
judge allowed him to proceed as the defense 
attorney. As the Supreme Court rightfully 
found, “During perhaps the most critical 
period of the proceedings against these defen-
dants, that is to say, from the time of their 
arraignment until the beginning of their trial, 
when consultation, thoroughgoing investiga-
tion and preparation were vitally important, 
the defendants did not have the aid of counsel 
in any real sense, although they were as much 
entitled to such aid during that period as at 
the trial itself” (Powell v. Alabama, 1932, p. 57). 
As noted by the Chief Justice of Alabama’s 
dissent, “the appearance was rather pro forma 
than zealous and active” (p. 58).
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The Supreme Court held that 
[I]n a capital case in which the defendant is 
unable to employ counsel and is incapable of 
adequately making his own defense because 
of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or 
the like, it is the duty of the court, whether 
requested or not, to assign counsel for him as 
necessary requisite of due process of law; and 
that duty is not discharged by an assignment 
at such time or under such circumstances as 
to preclude the giving of effective aid in the 
preparation and trial of the case. (Powell v. 
Alabama, 1932, p. 71) 
Although the Supreme Court did not give 
a definite example of what qualifies as ade-
quate representation, it clearly established 
that counsel is essential during the investi-
gatory phase of trial in order for an accused 
to sufficiently present his defense. The argu-
ment, thus, can be made that, in order to be 
effective, counsel must do an investigation 
before going to trial.
However, we are seeing a disheartening phe-
nomenon in capital murder cases. Defendants 
are being sentenced not on the merits of their 
cases but on the effectiveness of their counsel: 
“A member of the Georgia Board of Pardons 
and Paroles has said that if the files of 100 
cases punished by death and 100 punished by 
life were shuffled, it would be impossible to 
sort them out by sentence based upon infor-
mation in the files about the crime and the 
offender” (Bright, 1994, p. 1840).
There are countless examples of murder cases 
that are factually similar but with opposite 
sentencing results. This means that capital 
murder defendants are not being sentenced 
based on the merits of the case or severity of the 
crime but, rather, on whether their trial coun-
sel was effective in presenting their defense. 
There is a right to counsel during hearings, 
but there is no right to counsel in post-con-
viction proceedings. The consequence of poor 
legal representation in capital murder cases is 
that a large population of death row inmates 
(as opposed to inmates serving life or less 
than life sentences) is made up of people who 
are not distinguished by their crime but by 
their lawyer’s ineffectiveness. 
In 1984, the Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington held that the proper standard to 
determine whether counsel was effective was 
whether he was reasonably effective: “The 
benchmark for judging whether any claim 
of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s 
conduct so undermined the proper function-
ing of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result” (p. 686). To establish ineffectiveness, 
a defendant must show, first, that the coun-
sel’s performance was deficient, and second, 
that the errors were so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment (p. 687). Unfortunately, 
case law reveals that the courts have set an 
extremely low standard for defense counsel 
to meet.
According to Bright (1994),
Death sentences have been imposed in cases in 
which defense lawyers had not even read the 
state’s death penalty statute or did not know 
that a capital trial is bifurcated into separate 
determinations of guilt and punishment.1 
State trial judges and prosecutors—who have 
taken oaths to uphold the law,2 including the 
Sixth Amendment—have allowed capital trials 
to proceed and death sentences to be imposed 
even when defense counsel fought among 
themselves or presented conflicting defenses 
for the same client; referred to the clients by 
a racial slur3; or cross-examined a witness 
whose direct testimony counsel missed because 
he was parking his car, slept through portions 
of the trial,4 or was intoxicated during trial.5 
Appellate courts often review and decide cap-
ital cases on the basis of appellate briefs that 
would be rejected in a first-year legal writing 
course in law school. (pp. 1842-1843)
It has been over 70 years since the Supreme 
Court found in Powell that an attorney is 
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ineffective if he fails to conduct any investi-
gation but merely accompanies the accused to
court. It is an abomination that our legal pro-
fession renders our colleagues effective when
they have done nothing more than sit next to
their client in court. Representation in many
trials today is no better than that provided to
the boys of Scottsboro. The only difference is
that today we are holding these members of
the Bar to be effective counsel.
The financial costs of defending a capital
case are extremely high. Paying for court-ap-
pointed counsel is a burden that the State
bears, thus, naturally, it tries to keep costs to
a minimum. However, we must also keep in
mind that a prosecutor’s role is not to see that
a conviction is made, but to see that justice is
served. Justice is not served when a defendant
whose life is at stake is not afforded quality
representation:
So long as juries and judges are equally 
deprived of critical information and the Bill 
of Rights is ignored in the most emotionally 
and politically charged cases due to deficient 
legal representation, the courts should not be 
authorized to impose the extreme and irrevo-
cable penalty of death. Otherwise, the death 
penalty will continue to be imposed, not upon 
those who commit the worst crimes, but upon 
those who have the misfortune to be assigned 

















The enemy was the endemic meanness of the 
system. Every day the state hauls in the dregs 
of society. These miscreants fill the courtrooms 
with the sounds of their contrived excuses and 
their tinny pleas for mercy. We despise them 
for their injuries and pain they impose upon 
us. The accused are mean. Murder is mean. 
And meanness is contagious. The system has 
caught it. (Spence, 2003, p. 27)
If our society is to continue to execute crim-
inals, we must ensure that every person 
accused of a capital crime is afforded the best 
legal representation and a fair, impartial trial. 
At a minimum, this is what the constitutional 
right to due process provides. Taking away 
someone’s life as a penalty for committing a 
crime is the most serious and final punish-
ment. Unlike other sentences, once the exe-
cution is completed, it cannot be undone. 
Therefore, regardless of our moral and polit-
ical beliefs, the death penalty is not for those 
who are innocent. It is the role of the crimi-
nal process to separate the innocent from the 
guilty. Unfortunately, the system has not been 
perfect, or even close to it.
I disagree with Justice Scalia’s argument 
that “reversal of an erroneous conviction 
on appeal or on habeas, or the pardoning of 
an innocent condemnee through executive 
clemency, demonstrates not the failure of 
the system but its success” (Kansas v. Marsh, 
2006). Of the hundreds of guilty men who are 
rightfully convicted, if only one innocent man 
had to spend years on death row until his 
innocence was proven, there would be a plau-
sible argument that our system was fair and 
constitutional. However, the number of men 
and women who have been released from 
death row due to post-conviction innocence 
is devastating. Habeas relief should not be the 
stage of a case where innocence is determined; 
the trial should. Proving innocence through 
appeal should be the exception, not the rule.
When an innocent man is convicted, two 
severe injustices occur: (1) an innocent man 
loses a basic human right that is guaranteed 
to him by our Constitution: life and liberty; 
and (2) a guilty man is free to dwell in society, 
living in our communities and being capable 
of committing more heinous crimes.
My concern is not that the structure of our 
system is inadequate but that there are so 
many hurdles placed in the way of the accused 
on his quest to prove his innocence. Hurdles 
such as ineffective assistance of counsel, judi-
cial bias, prosecutorial misconduct, and inad-
equate forensic evidence being used against 
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him. If we are going to take away a man’s life 
by imposing such a final punishment as the 
death penalty, at the very least we must do 
so firmly adhering to the guidelines of our 
Constitution. 
Endnotes
1    “An Alabama defense lawyer asked for time 
between the guilt and penalty phases so 
that he could read the state’s death penalty 
statute.” (State v. Smith, 1990).
2    “A judge in a Florida case took a defense 
lawyer in chambers during the penalty phase 
to explain what it was about. The lawyer 
responded: ‘I’m at a total loss. I really don’t 
know what to do in this type of proceeding. 
If I had been through one, I would, but I’ve 
never handled one except this time.’” (Douglas 
v. Wainwright, 1983)
3   Defendant was called a “little nigger boy” by 
his own counsel during closing arguments 
(Goodwin v. Balkcom, 1982).
4   “A judge in Harris County, Texas, responded 
to a capital defendant’s complaints about his 
lawyer sleeping during trial at which death 
was imposed, stating: ‘The Constitution does 
not state that the lawyer has to be awake.’” 
Bright, 1994)
5   Counsel, an alcoholic, was arrested on his way 
to court and found to be well over the legal 
limit, but the court was not willing to presume 
ineffective assistance of counsel against 
attorneys who were under the influence 
(People v. Garrison, 1986).
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